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1 Introduction
In the last decades, developments in information and transportation technology
have made it faster to cover the distance between any two countries and smoothened
the contract of various transactions. We have also observed the number of trade
agreements among countries increase rapidly. Each trade agreement drastically re-
duces the explicit and implicit trade barriers, such as tari® and administration costs.
While developments in technology are exogenous to governments, conclusion of trade
agreements is based on governmental decision. The decisions of trade agreements are
totally endogenous for each government. As is pointed out by Bhagwati and Pana-
gariya (1996), decentralized decisions among multiple countries result in \building
blocs" or \ stumbling blocs". When the negotiations of free trade agreements (FTA)
are decentralized, the ability of government to foresee the future networks would be
critical. While there are several papers on FTA, most of the papers are based on
competitive framework.
This paper constructs a monopolistic competition model involving three sym-
metric countries with positive transportation costs to examine endogenous trade
agreements. The geographical unit can be country, international regions or intra-
national regions if we could assume the immobility of workers. For example, three
regions can be referred as Asia, North America, and EU. When reduction of trade
costs results in a lower price of goods, it increases domestic welfare unambiguously.
However trade agreements among the other countries could deteriorate the welfare
at home. The decentralized conclusions of trade agreements could be interpreted as
a network formation game. Furusawa and Konishi (2007) analyze network forma-
tions among many heterogeneous countries with respect to stability but, the degree
of farsightedness is not analyzed. In the study on strategic behavior of governments,
while Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) employ Cournot competition model with in¯nite
time, we employ monopolistic competition in ¯nite time. Since BTA requires sub-
stantial reduction in trade barriors, the number of BTA concluded between countries
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is at most ¯nite. Krugman (1993a) noted the limitation of a-twocountry framework
and emphasized the role of hubs which he alternatively called star links. With the
models of monopolistic competition, for example, by Ago, Isono and Tabuchi (2006),
Behrens (2007), Mori and Nishikimi (2002), and Behrens, Gaigne, Ottaviano and
Thisse (2006), the emergence of hub and its e®ects are analyzed in international
economics and in economic geography. However, the endogenous determination of
trade agreements is still left aside. This paper explicitly considers the e®ects from
changes in trade network on distribution of ¯rms and characterize the behavior of
governments as welfare-maximizing with respect to vision, myopic or farsighted in
a three-stage game.
Our simple model show that regardless of vision or foresight, a complete network
is achieved. While Krugman (1993b) discussed that \world welfare is minimised
when there are three blocs", our results imply optimistic ex-post path to this dis-
cussion. Even though world trading blocs are formed into three and minimizes the
world welfare, three blocks will achieve the free trade world in the the end regardless
of government vision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the
basic framework of the model, while Section III formulates the types of government
behavior and compare the outcomes. Finally, we o®er some concluding comments.
2 The model
2.1 Consumers and ¯rms
The economy consists of three countries A, B, and C, where the geographi-
cal unit can be international regions or intranational regions. For simpler argument,
we call the unit as country. There are two types of production sectors, the com-
petitive and manufacturing sectors. In order to highlight the role of government
behavior in the following section, three countries are assumed to be symmetric in
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population, endowments and technology. We normalize each population, the num-
ber of ¯rms, and the amount of capital as one. Then the number of ¯rms in each
country is identical to the share of ¯rms in this economy. We put the share of ¯rms
in country r by ¸r 2 [0; 1] and from de¯nition,
P
r=A;B;C ¸r = 1 always holds. Each
individual supplies one unit of labour inelastically within their residential country
and is assumed to be endowed one unit of capital. Their consumption behavior is
characterized by the following utility function as,
Ur =
C1¡¹r M
¹
r
¹¹ (1¡ ¹)1¡¹ ; and Mr =
Ã X
s=A;B;C
Z ¸s
0
m
¾¡1
¾
sr (v) dv
! ¾
¾¡1
; (1)
where M stands for an index of the consumption of the manufactured good, ¾
is the elasticity of substitution between any manufactured goods, and the lower
subscript, r, expresses the country of consumption or production. While C is the
consumption of homogeneous good, e.g. agriculture good, msr (v) expresses the
demand for a di®erentiated manufactured good indexed v; which is produced at
country s and is consumed at country r. Using the same index and subsrcipts,
the price for a di®erentiated manufactured good is denoted by psr (v). Moreover,
while domestic transfer doesn't incur any transportation costs, for any shipment
of di®erentiated goods across countries, transportation costs of the iceberg type
are incurred. Assuming the symmetric transportation costs between countries, we
de¯ne this transportation costs as ¿ rs = ¿ ; ¿ rr = 1, where ¿ is the fraction which
melts away during transport. Then the price of country r0s product is transferred
to country s can be expressed as, prs = pr¿ rs = pr¿ : For later reference, we put the
measure of trade openness by Á = (¿)1¡¾ 2 [0; 1], which can be interpreted as the
fraction of the product that reaches the destination. The budget constraint can be
written as,
Yr = wr + kr = Cr + PrMr; and Pr =
Ã X
s=A;B;C
Z ¸s
0
(psr (v))
1¡¾ dv
! 1
1¡¾
; (2)
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where Y , w, k, p (v) and P denote income, wage, capital reward, price of a manu-
factured good indexed v and the price index of manufactured varieties. A worker in
country r maximizes utility in (1) ; subject to the budget constraint (2). Standard
utility maximization yields the following equations;
Cr = (1¡ ¹)Yr; (3)
msr (v) = ¹p
¡¾
s (v) (¿ rs)
1¡¾ P ¾¡1r Yr; (4)
Vr =
Yr
P ¹r
: (5)
Vr is the indirect utility function in country r. The competitive sector produces
a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale technology using labor only.
This homogeneous good is assumed to be shipped costlessly. Thus we take this
as numeraire and normalize the labour wage one, wr = 1. On the other hand, the
manufacturing sector requires one unit of capital as ¯xed input and labor as marginal
input requirement and exhibits increasing returns to scale. We set the cost function
of the manufacturing sector as ¼r +mr (v) ; where ¼r is the rental cost for one unit
of capital in country r and mr is the sum of national demands of a di®erentiated
good, mr (v) =
P3
s=1mrs (v). Taking the demand of its good as given, each ¯rm
sets its price so as to maximize its pro¯t as
p (v) = p =
¾
¾ ¡ 1 : (6)
In equilibrium all varieties are symmetric. Thus we could drop the variety index
(v) for simpler notation. With the normalizations, we could rewrite the price index
as,
Pr =
¾
¾ ¡ 1
Ã X
s=A;B;C
¸rÁrs
! ¡1
¾¡1
: (7)
Since capital is used only for the ¯xed input and potential entrants in this sector
ensure the zero-pro¯t condition, rents to capital is expressed as a form of operating
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pro¯ts:
¼r (¸r) = mr (pr ¡ 1) = 1
¾
mr: (8)
Capital moves to the country which gives the highest returns denoted by ¼r(¸r).
This results in a ¯rm distribution which signi¯es that the capital rent is identical in
all countries in equilibrium. The equilibrium condition implies the following motion
of capital arbitrage;
¼ ´ ¼r (¸r) = ¼s (¸s) ; r 6= s: (9)
Then national income is shown to be invariant to the distribution of ¯rms and
simply written as Yr = ¼ + w.
2.2 Trade agreements
We assume that the conclusion of trade agreements unambiguously decreases
trade costs, which is expressed by ± > 1. As mentioned in the introduction, in the
post-BTA scenario transportation costs would remain. The reduction of trade costs
is evaluated by the level of ex-ante total trade costs which includes transportation
costs. Since the measure of trade costs ranges from zero to one, Á 2 [0; 1], even after
the conclusion, the improved trade costs should not exceed one.
0 < ±Á < 1 (10)
Then we regard the process to construct a trade agreement as a network for-
mation. In what follows, we call the situation about the conclusion of trade agree-
ments is denoted simply as network, which is expressed as an undirected graph on
fA;B;Cg(we can also identify it with a subset of the set of links fAB;BC;CAg1).
Given a network g, a transportation cost between country r and s is denoted by Ágrs,
1For instance, since AB expresses the linkage between A and B, it is clear that BA = AB.
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and hence we have
Ágrs =
8>>>><>>>>:
Á± if r 6= s; rs 2 g,
Á if r 6= s; rs =2 g,
1 if r = s.
Similarly, we denote the share of ¯rms for country r given a network g by ¸gr . Let
¸r ´ (¸gr)r=A;B;C .
With the above notation, we can obtain the capital rent for each country r given
a network g, ¼r (¸
g), as
¼r (¸
g) =
¹
¾
X
s=A;B;C
Ys
¢gs
Ágsr; (11)
where
¢gs =
X
t=A;B;C
¸gtÁ
g
ts.
for any country s. The capital arbitrage condition should hold among all the coun-
tries, which is expressed as ¼r (¸
g) = ¼s (¸
g) for any r and s. Applying the capital
arbitrage condition for a given network, we can solve the distribution of ¯rms ¸g
as is listed in Appendix A.1. As is shown in Figure 1, we have two cases of corner
solutions |{ the case of ¸
fijg
k = 0 and the case of ¸
fij;jkg
j = 1 for distinct countries
i; j and k. The former one occurs when a given network is fijg, where the two coun-
tries i and j share all the ¯rms evenly, and the latter occurs when a given network
fij; jkg or what is alternatively called star network, where the hub country j gets
all the ¯rms.
Moreover, we de¯ne the objective function of the government, social welfare, of
each country r as the indirect utility function of all residents in the country and it
may be written as
W gr =
Yr
(P gr )
¹ = Y (¢
g
r)
¹
¾¡1 (12)
Considering the symmetry assumption among the three countries given a particular
population, since wage and capital rent are equal among the countries, the national
(regional) incomes are identical. Thus, without loss of generality, we drop the sub-
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0
Á
±
10:5
1
2
3
4
±1
1
Á
±2
¸ijk = 0 and ¸
ij;jk
j = 1
¸ij;jkj = 1
otherwise
Figure 1: Distribution of ¯rms: concentration and absence
script r in income, Y . Since the price index of country r given a network g, P gr , can
be expressed as (¢gr)
1
1¡¾ ; social welfare is dependent only on price indices at each
region. The value of W gr is listed in Appendix A.2.
Using the above obtained welfare, we assume governments compare the welfare
scenario for the given di®erent networks in the following way. First we de¯ne W ghr
for any distinct network g; h and any country r as
W ghr ´
W hr
W gr
=
µ
P gr
P hr
¶¹
=
µ
¢hr
¢gr
¶ ¹
¾¡1
: (13)
Note that the decision on the approval of BTA by country r depends on the
value of ¢hr=¢
g
r . Then we de¯ne and use D
gh
r for any distinct network g; h and any
country r as
Dghr ´
¡
W ghr
¢¾¡1
¹ ¡ 1; for r = A;B;C and distinct g; h ½ fAB;BC;CAg , (14)
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which implies the welfare change of country r from network g to network h. Fur-
thermore, for the brief notation, we de¯ne
Dg+ijr ´ Dgg[fijgr (15)
for any network g and any link ij =2 g. Each government can evaluate their decision
based on this welfare di®erential in (13). The outcome networks and the corner
solutions where there are no ¯rms in a country or where all ¯rms concentrate in a
single country are summarized in Figure 1. Since pro¯t of monopolistic companies
are constant among any network g, as is shown in Appendix A, the source of trade
agreements the reduction in trade costs resulted from the conclusion of BTA a®ects
real wage only through price indices, and the distribution of ¯rms.
3 Vision of government
Now, we introduce a simple dynamic game for conclusion-network formation
by national government. Suppose that countries A, B and C are facing situations
to determine which BTA to conclude. Every country is concerned only with its
own social welfare. In order to maximize its own social welfare, each government
organizes conferences to discuss the reduction of trade barriers by BTA. In this
game, we focus only on bilateral conferences and later discuss multilateral conference
case. Each conference has to conclude at most one BTA between participants.
We assume decisions are irreversible so that all countries decide their own actions
without considering the break of connected links.
For further understanding, we specify a word, \Conference". \Conference" is
de¯ned as a meeting to consult about forming a link between two participating
governments, which represent the end points of the link. The conference on forming
link X is denoted by Conference X for X = AB, BC, CA. In order to clarify the
di®erence of these networks from the outcome network, we refer to a network formed
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on the way as \en route network". In addition, we suppose that the welfare of each
country is not transferable. Hereon, we consider and compare two types ofvision of
governments: myopic and farsighted.
3.1 Myopic games
First, we consider the case that all governments of countries are myopic decision
makers: we suppose that participants of each conference take into account only how
their payo®s change when they link, not how those ¯nally change after all confer-
ences. We denote the conclusion-network formation game with myopic governments
by ¡M (Á; ±). In our paper, we simply call ¡M (Á; ±) the \myopic game" for (Á; ±).
By the above setup, we can assert the result of every conference with each change
of the participant's social welfare by forming a link: a conference makes a conclusion
to link only if both the welfares of the participants are strictly improved; otherwise
it decides not to link. Moreover, any conference does not make a conclusion once
the previous one determines not to link since it faces the same situation as the
previous one by symmetry. Hence the possible outcome networks are only ?, fABg,
fAB;BCg and fAB;BC;CAg. Then we show that actually ? and fAB;BCg can
not be outcome networks and exhibit the condition where the outcome network is
complete and where it becomes fABg.
Proposition 1 Suppose all the governments of countries make choices myopically,
then the outcome network is always complete.
Therefore, star networks can not be formed due to the fact that there is al-
ways Pareto improvement for region C and A from the conclusion of fCAg under
fAB;BCg.
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3.2 Farsighted games
Next, we consider the case that all governments are farsighted decision makers:
we suppose that they take into account the social welfares gains after all conferences.
Therefore, they make actions thinking over how their actions a®ect the subsequent
conferences, so that we need to specify the optimal strategy for each country by back-
ward induction. We denote the conclusion-network formation game with farsighted
governments by ¡F (Á; ±). In our paper, we simply call ¡F (Á; ±) the \farsighted
game" for (Á; ±).
In order to simplify the discussion, we use the following scenario tree as in Figure
2.
Figure 2: The scenario tree
The time °ows from the top to the bottom as follows. The node at the top
describes the turn of Conference AB which is of course given the empty network ?
as the en route network, and the two branches grown from that node indicate the
decision of Conference AB, linking together and not linking. Therefore, both of the
two nodes at the second highest level describe the turns of Conference BC, but the
en route network one node faces is di®erent from that another faces. In fact, the en
route networks are fABg and ?. Similarly to Conference AB, the branches grown
from the nodes indicate the decisions of Conference BC. Finally, the four nodes
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at the lower level describe the turns of Conference CA, whose en route networks
are respectively fAB;BCg, fABg,fBCg and ?, and the eight nodes at the bottom
describe the outcome networks.
With the scenario tree, we analyze the outcomes of the dynamic games compar-
ing it with those of the myopic games. Since we proved that the outcome network
in a myopic game can be the complete network fAB;BC;CAg , we consider all
the farsighted pro¯les (Á; ±) at once. When the outcome network is complete in
¡M (Á; ±), by symmetry, each conference must conclude to link whichever en route
network it faces in ¡F (Á; ±). Hence, the outcome network in ¡F (Á; ±) is also com-
plete. This is the case that strategically avoiding from ending as a star network by
the others, any of two governments agree to conclude BTA for any given en route
network. Summarizing the above, we conclude by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The outcome of the farsighted game ¡F (Á; ±) is also the complete
network.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In the process of growing trade networks, we examine pairwise improvements
of trade costs among three countries via bilateral trade agreements. We extensively
analyze the di®erent outcome networks depending on government vision. In the
previous section, we show that myopic and farsighted games never induce a star
network and that for any (Á; ±), the myopic game and farsighted game yields the
complete network. Our results suggest an optimistic view to Krugman's discussion
that free trade among varioous countries in the world will be achieved regardless of
the vision of governments, even though the world is divided into three symmetric
FTA-regions which gives the worst social welfare.
12
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Appendix A
A.1 Distribution of ¯rms
By specifying each phase, we explicitly solve for the distribution of ¯rms and
the welfare di®erential for each countries. While the rotation of the conferences are
speci¯ed in this appendix, due to the symmetry of three countries the results remain
unchanged.
A.1.1 Pro¯t at each phase
From the assumption of equally endowed capital and normalization in wage, popu-
lation and the number of ¯rms, the reward from capital can be written as N¼=3 =
¼=3 (= k) : Plugging this capital reward into the regional income in (2) with (11),
then we may rewrite equation (11) as ¼g = Y ­g =
¡
1 + ¼
g
3
¢
­g where ­g ´
¹=¾
P
r=A;B;C Á
g
sr=¢
g
s expresses the distribution of ¯rms weighted by distance. Solv-
ing for the pro¯t at any phase, we have, ¼g = ­
g
1¡­g=3 . From the capital arbitrage
results which follows below, the equilibrium at each phase ­ is the same regardless
of location. Moreover, substituting the above mentioned variables into (11), obtain-
ing the result, ­g = 3¹=¾; 8g is straightforward: Thus pro¯t is constant across all
networks.
A.1.2 Empty network and complete networks
The solution for the distribution of ¯rms are given by
¸gA = ¸
g
B = ¸
g
C =
1
3
; where g = Á or fAB;BC;CAg
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A.1.3 When the network has only one link
Let i; j and k be distinct countries. Suppose that a BTA is concluded only
between countries i and j. Applying the capital arbitrage condition, the solution
for the distribution of ¯rms are given by
¸
fijg
i = ¸
fijg
j =
1
3
¡3Á+Á2+±Á+1
(1¡Á)(¡2Á+±Á+1) > ¸
fijg
k
¸
fijg
k =
1
3
Á±(1¡3Á)+(4Á2¡3Á+1)
(1¡Á)(¡2Á+±Á+1)
Note that although ¸gr should not exceed 1 and zero, keeping the restriction of
±Á < 0, we have ¸gr 2 [0; 1]. We have the case such that ¸fijgk = 0 and ¸fijgi =
¸
fijg
j =
1
2
. Equating to zero, we have the critical value for this corner solution,
1+4Á2¡3Á
Á(3Á¡1) ´ ±1 · ± < 1Á . When ± exceeds ±1, ¸fijgk is always zero. This result is
illustrated in Figure 1.
A.1.4 When the network is a star network with two links
Suppose that BTAs are concluded between countries i and j and between coun-
tries j and k. Let i; j and k distinct.
As is the same procedure for A.1.2, we obtain the solution for the distribution
of ¯rms by,
¸
fij:jkg
i = ¸
fij:jkg
k =
1
3
Á+±2Á2¡3±Á+1
(1¡±Á)(1¡Á(2±¡1)) < ¸
fij:jkg
j
¸
fij:jkg
j =
1
3
Á+4±2Á2¡3±Á¡3±Á2+1
(±Á¡1)(¡Á+2±Á¡1)
Restriction in the parameter, ±Á < 0, allows us to keep the variable of interest in
the reasonable range, ¸gr 2 [0; 1]. We have the case such that ¸fij:jkgi = ¸fij:jkgk = 0
and ¸
fij:jkg
j = 1. The critical value for this corner solution is
3¡p5¡4Á
2Á
´ ±2 · ± < 1Á .
When ± exceeds ±2 in the possible range, ¸
fij:jkg
i and ¸
fij:jkg
k are always zero. This
result is illustrated in Figure 1.
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A.2 Welfare
Using the above results, (12) and (13), we obtain welfare and decision criteria for
each country at each phase as in Table 1 and 2. The conditions listed in the table
indicate that ¸
fijg
k = 0 when ±1 · ± < 1Á and ¸fij;jkgj = 1 when ±2 · ± < 1Á , which is
obtained in Appendix A.1.
W Ár W
fijg
r W
fij;jkg
r W
fij;jk;kig
r
r = i 1+2Á
3
1+±Á
2
when ¸
fijg
k = 0
±Á+1¡2Á2
3(1¡Á) otherwise
±Á when ¸
fij;jkg
j = 1
1+Á¡2±2Á2
3(1¡±Á) otherwise
1+2±Á
3
r = j 1+2Á
3
1+±Á
2
when ¸
fijg
k = 0
±Á+1¡2Á2
3(1¡Á) otherwise
1 when ¸
fij;jkg
j = 1
2±2Á2¡1¡Á
3(2±Á¡1¡Á) otherwise
1+2±Á
3
r = k 1+2Á
3
Á when ¸
fijg
k = 0
±Á+1¡2Á2
3(±Á+1¡2Á) otherwise
±Á when ¸
fij;jkg
j = 1
1+Á¡2±2Á2
3(1¡±Á) otherwise
1+2±Á
3
Table 1: Welfare of three countries
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Appendix B
B.1 The proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We check the condition to form a link at each conference:
Conference AB DÁ+ABA > 0 and D
Á+AB
B > 0, so ± > 1. Therefore countries A and
B always link together.
Conference BC By the result of Conference AB, the en route network Conference
BC faces is fABg. In any case, DfABg+BCB > 0 and DfABg+BCC > 0 always
hold. Therefore countries B and C always link together.
Conference CA By the result of Conference AB and Conference CA, the en route
network Conference CA faces is fAB;BCg. In any case, DfAB;BCg+CAC > 0
and D
fAB;BCg+CA
A > 0 always hold. Therefore countries C and A always link
together.
Finally, the outcome network of ¡M (Á; ±) is always complete.
B.2 The proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We solve by backward induction. Note that for any distinct i; j and k,
D
Á+fijg
i > 0, D
fjkg+ij
i > 0, D
fjkg+ij
j > 0 and D
fij;jkg+ki
i > 0.
Conference CA In any case, DÁ+CAC > 0 and D
Á+CA
A > 0, D
fABg+CA
C > 0 and
D
fABg+CA
A , D
fBCg+CA
C > 0 and D
fBCg+CA
A > 0 and, D
fAB;BCg+CA
C > 0 and
D
fAB;BCg+CA
A > 0. Therefore for any en route network, countries C and A
always link together.
Conference BC Conference BC consider the strategy of Conference CA. When the
en route network Conference BC faces is Á, the outcome network is fBC;CAg
if countries B and C conclude a BTA, and fCAg if not. Since DfCAgfBC;CAgB =
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D
fCAg+BC
B > 0 and D
fCAgfBC;CAg
C = D
fCAg+BC
C > 0 in any case, countries B
and C decide to link together. When the en route network Conference BC faces
is fABg, the outcome network is fAB;BC;CAg if countries B and C conclude
a BTA, and fAB;CAg if not. Since DfAB;CAgfAB;BC;CAgB = DfAB;CAg+BCB > 0
and D
fAB;CAgfAB;BC;CAg
C = D
fCAg+BC
C > 0 in any case, countries B and C
decide to link together.
Conference AB Conference AB consider the strategies of Conference CA and
Conference BC. Since the en route network Conference AB faces is Á, the
outcome network is fAB;BC;CAg if countries A and B conclude a BTA,
and fBC;CAg if not. Since DfBC;CAgfAB;BC;CAgA = DfBC;CAg+ABA > 0 and
D
fBC;CAgfAB;BC;CAg
B = D
fBC;CAg+AB
B > 0 hold in any case, countries A and B
decide to link together.
Finally, the outcome network of ¡F (Á; ±) is also always complete.
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